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Abstract
We analyze the emerging trends from research on
multi-agent interaction protocols, on workflows and
on business processes. We propose a definition of
commitment-based interaction protocols, character-
ized by the decoupling of the constitutive and the
regulative specifications, where the latter is explic-
itly represented based on constraints among com-
mitments. The 2CL language, for writing regulative
specifications, is also presented.
1 Introduction
The term “interaction protocol” refers to a pattern of be-
havior that allows a set of agents to become a multi-agent
system (MAS), by engaging expected cooperations. Par-
ticularly relevant are commitment protocols [Singh, 2000;
Yolum and Singh, 2001; 2002]. Commitments are literals
that can hold in the social state of the system, representing the
fact that a debtor commits to a creditor to bring about some
condition. All agents using a commitment protocol share the
semantics of a set of actions which affect the social state. The
greatest advantages of commitment protocols, with respect
to other approaches to interaction, are that they do not over-
constrain the specification by imposing unnecessary orderings
on the execution of the shared actions, and that by giving a
public and agreed meaning to the social actions, they allow
working on actual knowledge rather than on beliefs about
each others’ mental states, preserving the agents’ autonomy.
Nonetheless, commitment protocols do not yet suit well those
situations where the evolution of the social state is constrained
by conventions, laws, preferences or habits, because they do
not allow the specification of legal patterns of interaction. We
tackle this problem by adopting Searle’s [1995] distinction
between the constitutive and regulative specifications of inter-
action. Constitutive rules, by identifying certain behaviors as
foundational of a certain type of activity, create that activity.
Regulative rules contingently constrain a previously consti-
tuted activity. They rule the “flow of activity”, by capturing
some important characteristics of how things should be carried
on in specific contexts of interaction [Cherry, 1973].
∗This paper is an extended abstract of the ACM Trans. on Int.
Sys. and Tech. publication [Baldoni et al., 2013].
A clear separation of the constitutive from the regulative
specification would bring many advantages, mostly as direct
effects of the obtained modularity: easier re-use of actions in
different contexts, easier customization on the protocol, easier
composition of protocols. As a consequence, MAS would gain
greater openness, interoperability, and modularity of design.
Interoperability would be better supported because it would
be possible to verify it with respect to specific aspects (e.g. at
the level of actions [Chopra and Singh, 2008; Chopra, 2009;
Chopra and Singh, 2009] or at the level of regulative rules
[Baldoni et al., 2011b]). Protocols would be more open in the
sense that their modularity would allow designers to easily
adapt them to different needs (see Section 4). Agents could
also check individually (against the protocol specification)
if they have actions that match with the constitutive rules
independently from the regulative specification.
Baldoni et al. [2013] analyze alternative proposals for the
specification of interaction protocols based on commitments,
showing that these proposals still miss the desired clear dis-
tinction. None allows the specification of both parts (1) in
a decoupled way, (2) by means of first-class languages, (3)
which allow flexible representations. It, then, proposes a model
that extends commitment-based interaction protocols with an
explicit regulative specification, given as a set of constraints
among commitments. For representing the latter, language
2CL is proposed. The language is characterized by a graphical
notation, aimed at supporting the designer in the specification
of interaction protocols.
2 Constitutive and Regulative Specifications
A commitment C(x, y, r, p) denotes that agent x commits to
an agent y to bring about the consequent condition p when the
antecedent condition r holds. When r equals true, the short
notation C(x, y, p) is used. Agents share a social state that
contains commitments and other literals that are relevant to
their interaction. Agents affect the social state by executing
actions, defined in terms of operations onto the social state (e.g.
adding a new commitment, releasing another agent from some
commitment [Yolum and Singh, 2002]). On the other hand,
agent behavior is affected by commitments because agents are
expected to respect the commitments they have taken. Thus,
commitments have a regulative nature.
A commitment protocol [Yolum and Singh, 2001; 2002;
Chopra, 2009] is a set of actions, whose semantics is known
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to (and agreed upon by) all of the participants. Most works on
agents adopt a precondition-effect view of actions. Precondi-
tions can either be to action execution or to some effect. The
former are literals that must hold in the social state to make
the action executable, the latter are additional conditions that
enable the production of the specific effect that they control.
For instance, in order to pay by credit card it is necessary to
own a credit card (precondition to the action). If a credit card
owner uses it for paying, the payment will be done only if the
card is valid (conditional effect). Protocol actions are specified
by means of constitutive rules.
In many applications, it is often necessary to specify pat-
terns of interaction which require a degree of expressiveness
that, as we will show, commitments alone do not have. Contrar-
ily to constitutive rules, which define new forms of behavior,
these patterns regulate antecedently existing forms of behavior
[Searle, 1995]: such rules regulate the social reality, defined
by the constitutive rules. For this reason we refer to them as
the regulative specification of the protocol. For example, a
purchase protocol may state that the payment must occur first
in order for the shipment to proceed. A regulative specification
may, therefore, be viewed as encoding a policy.
The current proposals show some limits in the realization of
this model, each with its pros and cons. Fornara and Colom-
betti’s proposal [2004a; 2004b] is too rigid: the use of in-
teraction diagrams conflicts with the desirable flexibility of
commitments because it forces the ordering of action execu-
tions. In this respect, ConDec’s use of constraints [Pesic and
van der Aalst, 2006] is better: the declarative approach that is
proposed (which does not involve commitments nor is set in
an agents’ framework) is aligned with the declarative nature
of commitments. The problem is that constraints are used
with a constitutive and not with a regulative aim. In other
words, the ConDec approach uses the constraints to define a
process with its execution traces. Moreover, they are defined
in terms of performing actions rather than of bringing about
conditions. Chopra and Singh [2008] propose an implemen-
tation where the regulative specification is given on top of
actions: while commitments are given on conditions and not
on the actions that should bring them about, constraints are
posed on the action execution, with the result that modularity
is not obtained. So, in order to impose that sending goods
should follow payment, the action send-goods should have as
a precondition a literal that is made true as an effect of the
action pay. This solution has two limits. The first is that it
does not abide by the meaning of “regulative” rule, i.e. to
regulate antecedently existing forms of behavior. Precondi-
tions are, in fact, part of the constitutive specification of the
actions because they help defining the rules of the game and to
specify the possibility of action [Searle, 1995; La Torre, 2010;
Grossi, 2007]. Moreover, their use forces the regimentation
of the regulation [Jones and Sergot, 1994] because it is not
possible to execute actions leading to violations. The adoption
of regimentation rather than enforcement should, however, be
left up to the designer of the system and not be imposed by
the specification framework [Grossi et al., 2007]. The same
holds for [Winikoff et al., 2005; Yolum and Singh, 2002; 2001;
Singh, 2003; El-Menshawy et al., 2010; 2011].
Our proposal (Figure 1) aims at overcoming the listed limits.
Figure 1: Decoupling between constitutive (actions) and regu-
lative (constraints) specifications.
We extend commitment-based protocols by adding the pos-
sibility of defining expressive regulative specifications, that
are not limited to commitments but that account for patterns
of interaction. To this aim we propose the use of a declara-
tive language, 2CL, which allows the definition of constraints
on the evolution of the social state. Such specifications pre-
serve the flexibility of commitment protocols because they
do not force agents to execute given paths but rather let them
free to choose their courses of actions, as long as they re-
spect the rules. 2CL constraints relate commitments and not
actions/events. This modularity facilitates the design of inter-
action protocols because it allows for a separate specification
of the actions and of the regulative part, once the vocabulary of
terms (facts, commitments) that can appear in the social state
is defined. It also facilitates the re-use of previously defined
actions or regulations as long as the domain of discourse does
not change. Regulations, in fact, are not hidden inside actions,
and actions are not over-specified for the need of including
regulations in their preconditions. This is, for instance, useful
in the case when a designer must tailor an interaction proto-
col to particular needs, a case that is discussed in the paper.
Another characteristic of the proposed language is that it is
a general tool, that leaves the designer free to choose how to
implement the specified regulations (e.g. by enforcement or
by regimentation) rather than forcing him/her in any direction.
3 2CL Commitment Protocols
We extend commitment-based protocols from [Chopra and
Singh, 2008; Chopra, 2009] by adding a regulative specifica-
tion, which captures the legal evolutions of the social state. An
interaction protocol P is a tuple 〈Ro, F,A,C〉, where Ro is
a set of roles, identifying the interacting parties, F is a set of
literals (including commitments) that can occur in the social
state, A is a set of actions, and C is a set of constraints. The
set of social actions A, defined on F and on Ro, forms the
constitutive specification of the protocol, while the set of con-
straints C, defined on F and on Ro again, forms the regulative
specification of the protocol.
We use as a running example the well-known FIPA Con-
tract Net Protocol (CNP for short), that includes two roles,
the initiator (i) and the participant (p). The initiator calls for
proposals. The participant may send a proposal or refuse to
do it. When a proposal is received, the initiator may either
reject or accept it. We do not model the exchange of infor-
mation concerning the proposal itself but only the interaction
concerning the task assignment and solution.
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We adopt the constitutive specification of an action in
[Chopra, 2009]. An action meaning is given in terms of how it
affects the social state by adding or removing literals or by per-
forming operations on the commitments (create, release, etc.,
see [Singh, 1999; Yolum and Singh, 2001]). The constitutive
specification follows the grammar below, where the means
construct amounts to a counts-as relation [Searle, 1995]:
A→ (Action means Operation)+
Action→ protocolAction([paramList])
Operation→ Op(commitment) | fact |
Operation ∧Operation
Op→ CREATE | DELETE | RELEASE | DELEGATE | ...
protocolAction identifies an interactive (observable) action
of the protocol; paramList denotes its parameters; Op is a
commitment operation; commitment is a commitment of form
C(x, y, r, p) (see also [Chopra, 2009, page 49]), where x and y
are roles in Ro and r and p are formulas in disjunctive normal
form of propositional literals in F ; and fact is a positive or
negative proposition that does not concern commitments and
which contributes to the social state.
These are the CNP actions as expressed by the grammar:
(a) send cfp(i, p) means CREATE(C(i, p, assigned task(i, p)))
(b) send proposal(p, i) means CREATE(C(p, i, solved task(p, i)))
(c) send refusal(p, i) means refused task(p, i)∧
RELEASE(C(i, p, assigned task(i, p)))
(d) send accept(i, p) means assigned task(i, p)
(e) send reject(i, p) means rejected proposal(i, p)∧
DELETE(C(i, p, assigned task(i, p)))∧
RELEASE(C(p, i, solved task(p, i)))
(f) send done(p, i) means solved task(p, i)
(g) send failure(p, i) means failed(p, i)∧
DELETE(C(p, i, solved task(p, i)))
They are quite straightforward. For instance, send cfp cre-
ates C(i, p, assigned task(i, p)), which states the resolution
of the initiator to assign a task to a participant. During the
execution the participant may refuse to solve the task or the
initiator may reject a proposal, e.g. because not convenient.
To represent regulative specifications, we propose the
declarative language 2CL (Constraints among Commitments
Language). 2CL has also a graphical notation, inspired by
ConDec [Pesic and van der Aalst, 2006] and by [Baldoni et
al., 2011a]. By means of it, the designer can express many
kinds of constraints describing the legal evolutions of the so-
cial state. As underlined in [Pesic and van der Aalst, 2006;
Baldoni et al., 2011a; Montali, 2010], constraint-based declar-
ative representations provide abstractions which allow to ex-
plicitly capture what is mandatory and what is forbidden, with-
out the need to express the set of possible executions exten-
sionally. For this reason, models remain compact improving
flexibility. This is an advantage with respect to procedural
approaches, characterized by a prescriptive nature which re-
quires the specification of all the allowed evolutions. It also
accommodates naturally to the commitment-based approach,
where a central issue is the respect of the agents’ autonomy.
2CL specifications follow the grammar:
C → (Disj op Disj)∗
Disj → Conj OR Disj | Conj XOR Disj | Conj
Conj → literal AND Conj | literal
C is a set of constraints of form A op B, where A and B
are formulas of literals and op is one of the operators described
in [Baldoni et al., 2013]; literal can be either a commitment
or a positive or negative proposition (negation means that the
proposition does not hold in the social state). The proposed
operators capture those kinds of constraints that the analysis
of protocols like CNP, Net Bill [Baldoni et al., 2011b] and
Robert’s Rules of Order [Baldoni et al., 2010] suggest being
the most useful for the regulative specification of interaction
protocols. For each relation, there are two types of constraint:
base constraints express what should become true in the social
state and when; persistence constraints capture conditions that
should hold in all the traversed states, until another condition
of interest becomes true.
For lack of space, we omit the description of the operators
that can be found in [Baldoni et al., 2013], and just report and
comment the regulative specification for CNP.
c1: C(i, p, assigned task(i, p)) •−.•
C(p, i, solved task(p, i)) XOR refused task(p, i)
c2: C(p, i, solved task(p, i)) •−.•
rejected proposal(i, p) XOR assigned task(i, p)
c3: assigned task(i, p) •−.• solved task(p, i) XOR failed(p, i)
The arrow •−.• represents the cause operator, expressing
the constraint that when the antecedent condition holds, af-
terwards, the consequent condition must become true sooner
or later. Accordingly, constraint c1 represents that when the
initiator must assign a task, the participant is expected to either
refuse the task or to take the commitment to solve it, although
this does not have to happen immediately at the next execution
step. The specification foresees that the participant cannot
take the initiative of proposing to solve a task (or of refusing
to do something) if the initiator has not declared that there
is a task to solve. Notice that we have not mentioned which
actions should be executed to change the social state: any
action, whose effect is compatible with the given schema of
evolution of the social state is feasible. c2 and c3 exploit the
same 2CL operator.
4 Tailoring the Contract Net Protocol
We show the versatility of the proposal by showing how easy it
is to vary the CNP protocol by playing with its regulative spec-
ification separately from the constitutive specification of its
actions. The first two simple variants are obtained by changing
a single 2CL operator. In both cases the constitutive specifi-
cations are left unchanged. If we substitute the cause relation
in c1 with a before relation (−.•), the participant will not be
obliged to answer with a proposal to the call of the initiator (it
is allowed to have an unresponsive behavior); however, when
a proposal is made, it must be made only after the call:
c1: C(i, p, assigned task(i, p)) −.•
C(p, i, solved task(p, i)) XOR refused task(p, i)
Instead, if one uses in c1 a response (•−.) operator, the par-
ticipant can also take the initiative to solve a task even though
the initiator has not made any request (zealous participant),
as it happens in the case of advertisement, where a provider
promotes its services:
c1: C(i, p, assigned task(i, p)) •−.
C(p, i, solved task(p, i)) XOR refused task(p, i)
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Then, we consider a call for bids where an initiator pub-
lishes an open call, e.g. in an official gazette, that does not
require the subscribers to the gazette to answer.
c1: C(i, p, assigned task(i, p)) −.•
C(p, i, solved task(p, i)) XOR refused task(p, i)
c2: C(p, i, solved task(p, i)) •−.•
rejected proposal(i, p) XOR assigned task(i, p)
c3: assigned task(i, p) •−. solved task(p, i) XOR failed(p, i)
c4: assigned task(i, p) −.• solved task(p, i)
That the participant is not obliged to send a bid is captured
by c1, which is a before (−.•) instead of being a cause (•−.•).
Constraint c3 captures that a participant can notify a failure
also when the task has not been assigned to it yet if, for some
reason, it finds out that it would be impossible for it to proceed
with the solution, were the task assigned to it. To capture
this behavior, instead of using a cause constraint, we use the
softer response constraint (•−.). We also add constraint c4 (of
kind before) to capture that a failure can be notified at any
moment while a solution can be communicated only after a
task is assigned to the participant.
The last variant leaves a much greater freedom of behavior
to the initiator and to the participant.
c1: C(p, i, solved task(p, i)) −.• assigned task(i, p)
c2: refused task(p, i) 6•−• C(p, i, solved task(p, i))
c3: rejected proposal(i, p) 6•−• assigned task(i, p)
The only constraint that is imposed on the evolution of the
social state is that a task cannot be assigned to a participant
who has not yet committed to solve it (c1). Moreover, c3 states
that proposal assignment and rejection are mutually exclusive
( 6•−•), and c2 that the refusal of a task is mutually exclusive to
the commitment to solve it. So a participant can express its
intention to solve a task for which no call was made, and it can
give a solution before it was assigned the task. The initiator
can ignore a participant even though it committed to solve the
task and not answer to it. It can call for proposals even if it
already has a commitment by the participant, and it can reject
a participant who did not make any proposal.
5 Discussion
Constraints cannot be represented (and, then, substituted) by
proper commitments because their expressive powers are dif-
ferent. For instance, CNP needs to express that the assignment
of a task to a participant is to be done prior to the execu-
tion of that task. One may think to represent this temporal
relationship by a conditional commitment of the kind: C(p,
i, assigned task(i, p), solved task(p, i) xor failed(p, i))
but commitments do not impose that the antecedent condition
be achieved first. If p solved the task before it was assigned to
it the commitment is discharged. Instead, assigned task(i, p)
•−.• solved task(p, i) XOR failed(p, i) means that the two
conditions are to be achieved in the order.
Another important feature is the nature of the two engage-
ments. Ever since their introduction, commitments have
been given an explicit normative nature [Castelfranchi, 1995;
Singh, 1999]. Also constraints, which define the patterns
of interaction of a protocol, have a normative nature, in the
sense that they represent what must hold in an execution for a
protocol to be respected. Both constraints and commitments,
due to their regulative nature, introduce a notion of violation
but while a commitment condition is to be achieved and, so,
commitment violations can be detected only at the end of the
interaction, violations to constraints can be detected during
the interaction. A constraint is, in fact, like a boundary that
should not be crossed.
The classical commitment-based approach is very respectful
of the agents’ autonomy. Autonomy implies that each agent
decides what is the best for itself. So, protocols do not dictate
agents when to execute specific actions. This spirit is respected
by 2CL, even though our protocols include a regulative spec-
ification which restricts the acceptable executions, because
2CL does not regiment the regulative rules. Let us explain
the meaning of opportunity, and the possibility to incur into a
violation, with the help of a simple example: suppose that at a
summer school the official language everybody should speak
is English. Every student at the school has a badge reporting
the name and the nationality of the person. If a French attendee
meets a colleague whose badge says she is from France, the
first student might decide to speak in French even though the
official language is English. The clear expected advantage is
a better understanding. However, the violation of the rules
introduces a risk: if the second student by mistake took the
badge of her roommate, she might not understand the former
because the protocol is not attended.
Finally let us consider constraints between commitments
with different debtors, like C(c, m, purchase(goods)) •−.•
C(m, c, sold(goods, price)) by which the commitment of the
customer c to buy some goods is to be followed by the commit-
ment of the merchant m to sell the goods at the agreed price.
It may seem, in this case, that the autonomy of the merchant
is reduced by the fact that another agent took some commit-
ment, but it is not so. In fact, since constraints are supposed to
be public and inspectable specifications, an agent, willing to
play a role in a protocol, has the means for understanding if
that pattern of interaction meets its goals. By autonomously
deciding whether entering the protocol it, however, commits to
respect its rules along the whole interaction. The fact that all
agents accept to respect the rules has the advantage of making
the course of interaction predictable and, therefore, of giving
guarantees to all of the participants.
[Baldoni et al., 2014] introduces a software engineering
methodology (2CL Methodology) for designing 2CL proto-
cols, for specialising them, and for composing a new 2CL pro-
tocols based on a set of given 2CL protocols. It also presents
a set of integrated software tools for the design and the anal-
ysis of 2CL protocols. Moreover, [Marengo et al., 2011]
introduces temporal expressions as antecedent and consequent
conditions of commitments and formalizes commitment pro-
gression along the occurrence of events.
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